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Abstract
Faces provide not only cues to an individual’s identity, age, gender, and ethnicity but also insight
into their mental states. The aim was to investigate the temporal aspects of processing of facial
expressions of complex mental states for very short presentation times ranging from 12.5 to 100
ms in a four-alternative forced choice paradigm based on Reading the Mind in the Eyes test.
Results show that participants are able to recognise very subtle differences between facial expres-
sions; performance is better than chance, even for the shortest presentation time. Importantly, we
show for the first time that observers can recognise these expressions based on information
contained in the eye region only. These results support the hypothesis that the eye region plays a
particularly important role in social interactions and that the expressions in the eyes are a rich
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source of information about other peoples’ mental states. When asked to what extent the
observers guessed during the task, they significantly underestimated their ability to make correct
decisions, yet perform better than chance, even for very brief presentation times. These results
are particularly relevant in the light of the current COVID-19 pandemic and the associated
wearing of face coverings.
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Faces are amongst the most complex objects processed by the human visual system and
contain a wealth of information (Bruce & Young, 1986). In addition to providing cues to an
individual’s identity, age, gender, and ethnicity, faces provide insight into an individual’s
emotions, beliefs, and intentions (Leslie, 1995). In other words, faces are the central focus for
our ability to attribute mental states to others. As such, facial expressions are an important
component of nonverbal communication and provide information which is critical for social
interactions (Ekman, 1973). In processing facial expressions, humans recruit an expansive
network of brain regions, including the superior temporal sulcus, orbitofrontal cortex, insu-
lar cortex, and the amygdala (Haxby et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 1997; Pitcher et al., 2017).
Facial expressions engage rapid visual processing mechanisms; less than 100 ms of expo-
sure is typically sufficient to identify facial expressions of emotion (Calvo & Esteves, 2005;
Neath & Itier, 2014). A wealth of evidence, however, points to the view that there are
significant differences in the time-course of processing different facial expressions (e.g., hap-
piness and anger) (Milders et al., 2008; Nummenmaa & Calvo, 2015; Palermo & Coltheart,
2004). For example, a number of studies have utilised a simultaneous discrimination para-
digm to demonstrate that angry faces are detected more rapidly than either happy or neutral
faces (Fox et al., 2000; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; €Ohman et al., 2001; Sato & Yoshikawa,
2010; Sawada et al., 2014). In line with this behavioural evidence, it has been reported that
the latencies of event-related potentials (ERP) components associated with facial expression
processing are significantly shorter for angry, relative to happy, faces (Feldmann-Wu¨stefeld
et al., 2011). It has been proposed that these differences in perceptual latency reflect the
ecological salience of particular emotions (Li et al., 2018). Specifically, rapid detection of a
facial expression which communicates threat (e.g., an angry face) may be advantageous for
survival (€Ohman et al., 2001). It should be noted, however, that a number of studies have
found no evidence of a detection advantage for angry faces (Becker et al., 2011; Calvo &
Nummenmaa, 2008). It has been suggested that these conflicting results can be explained by
methodological differences across several studies (Nummenmaa & Calvo, 2015), where
detection advantage is rather determined by the perceptual features of an image (e.g.,
contrast).
The angry-advantage for the detection of emotion notwithstanding, a good deal of evi-
dence points to the conclusion that positive facial expressions (e.g., happiness) are identified
more readily than negative expressions (e.g., sadness) (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; Lepp€anen
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& Hietanen, 2004; Milders et al., 2008; Neath & Itier, 2014; Palermo & Coltheart, 2004).
For example, Calvo and Lundqvist (2008) found that happy expressions were identified more
accurately and rapidly than faces exhibiting sadness, anger, or fear. This happiness-
advantage persists when schematic faces are utilised to control for physical differences
between happy and sad faces (Lepp€anen & Hietanen, 2004). It has been proposed that the
happiness-advantage can be explained by the fact that happiness is the only pleasant basic
emotion or by the upturned mouth which is a facial manifestation unique to happiness
(Nummenmaa & Calvo, 2015). At the other end of the spectrum, it has been reported that
fear is recognised more slowly than the other basic emotions (Calvo et al., 2014; Calvo &
Lundqvist, 2008; Palermo & Coltheart, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2008). The evidence for this
fear-disadvantage, however, is mixed; other studies have found no difference between the
processing of fearful, angry, neutral, and sad facial expressions (Calvo & Nummenmaa,
2009; Milders et al., 2008). It has also been proposed that, rather than being categorised
by means of discrete categories, such as happiness or sadness, facial expressions are better
described with respect to continuous variables along different dimensions, for example,
arousal and valence (Russell, 1994; Schmidtmann et al., 2020, Takehara & Suzuki, 1997).
For example, an angry face is high in arousal and negative in valence, while a bored face is
low in arousal and average in valence. In support of this latter view in particular, partic-
ipants’ ratings of facial expressions have been found to be successfully captured by two
independent dimensions: valence and arousal (Takehara & Suzuki, 1997). Furthermore,
describing facial expressions in terms of dimensions, rather than discrete categories, is
more consistent with evidence of differences in perceived facial expression intensity (Hess
et al., 1997). More recently, it has been proposed that humans use both categorical and
dimensional approaches to process facial expressions (Fujimura et al., 2012; Harris et al.,
2012). Nevertheless, most previous investigations of the temporal properties of facial expres-
sion processing have focused upon a small number of basic emotions.
As already noted, the majority of previous studies have investigated the time-course of
facial expression processing for only a limited number of basic emotions (e.g., happiness,
sadness, fear, surprise, disgust, and anger) and for full faces. In this study, we are interested
in the temporal dynamics of the perception of facial expressions beyond the basic emotions.
Previous literature has shown that the eye region in particular plays an important role in
human social interactions and that the expressions in the eyes are a rich source of informa-
tion about other peoples’ mental states (for recent review, see Grossmann, 2017). To our
knowledge, the ability to identify nuanced differences between facial expressions, specifically
the eye region alone, which are considerably more similar, in terms of arousal and valence
ratings, compared to the basic emotional categories (e.g., happiness or anger) has not been
tested before. For example, it has not been established whether humans can reliably identify
differences between facial expressions of upset, despondence, and disappointment and
whether this information can be extracted from the eye region. Further, the temporal aspects
of processing these complex mental states have not been investigated. This study aimed to
extend understanding of differences in the time-course of processing facial expressions
beyond the basic emotions at short presentation times.
Methods
Participants
Thirty individuals (20 women, 2 nonbinary, and 8 men; mean age: 21 years, range: 18–30
years) participated in the study. All participants reported at least 10 years of English
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fluency and were naı¨ve as to the purpose of the experiment. Participants had normal, or
corrected-to-normal, vision. All participants were recruited through a McGill Facebook
group. Written informed consent was obtained from each participant. Further details are
summarised in Table 1. All experiments were approved by the McGill University Ethics
committee (dossier number 51-0714) and were conducted in accordance with the original
Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus
Experiments were performed in a dimly illuminated room. Stimuli were presented, using
MATLAB (MATLAB R 2018b, MathWorks) and routines from the Psychtoolbox-3
(Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997), on a gamma-corrected Mitsubishi
Diamond Pro 2070 CRT monitor with a resolution of 1,280 1,024 pixels and a frame
rate of 80 Hz (mean luminance: 60 cd/m2). The monitor was controlled by a MacBook
Air computer (2015, 1.6 GHz). Participants viewed the stimuli at a distance of 55 cm. At
this distance, one pixel subtended 0.037 visual angle.
Table 1. Subject Details.
Subject
ID Age Gender Race Religion
Country
of origin
Years in
Canada Guess rate
1 23 Male Asian Hinduism India 11 60–70 (65)
2 22 Female White None Canada 22 40
3 21 Female Multiracial None Brazil 0.83 60
4 24 Female Other None Iran 22 40
5 19 Female White/Asian Christianity Canada 19 50
6 30 Male White Christianity Canada 30 40
7 23 Female White None Canada 23 75
8 24 Female White Christianity Canada 24 50
9 20 Male White None Canada 20 65
10 20 Female Asian None China 14 40
11 19 Female White Christianity France 3 30
12 19 Female Hispanic None Colombia 16 90
13 20 Male White/Hispanic None Multicultural 8 55
14 18 Female Asian None Vietnam 1 55
15 21 Male Asian None Vietnam 17 75
16 19 Male Asian None China 1 50
17 24 Female Asian None China 11 60
18 23 Female Hispanic Other Peru 4 50
19 23 Male Other Christianity Peru 3 60
20 22 Female Asian Buddhism China 17 30
21 22 Female Asian Christianity Korea 22 65
22 21 Female White None Russia 9 50
23 20 Male White None Canada 20 40
24 21 Female Asian None Canada 21 35
25 20 Female Black Christianity Canada 20 55
26 22 Non-binary White None United States 25 60
27 21 Non-binary White/Asian None United States 3 75
28 19 Female Black Christianity United States 4 35–40 (37.5)
29 20 Female White Judaism United States 2 15
30 20 Female White None Canada 20 25
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Stimuli
The stimuli were taken from the McGill Face Database (Schmidtmann et al., 2020). The full
McGill Face Database contains colour photographs of 93 different expressions of mental
states portrayed by two English-speaking professional actors (one male and one female). For
this study, we used the 36 photographs from the McGill Face Database which match the
expressions portrayed in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET, Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997, 2001), which consists of 36 black and white images of eye regions of female (17) and
male (19) individuals; taken from magazines. The McGill stimuli were captured for a full-
face test of facial expression sensitivity, without any specific focus being placed on the ocular
region. The stimuli (18 females and 18 males, see Table 2) were cropped to isolate the eye
region, converted to black and white (eight-bit greyscale) and adjusted to match the size of
the original RMET stimuli. The resultant stimuli were presented in the centre of a mid-grey
background (mean luminance 60 cd/m2). When viewed at the test distance, the stimuli had
a size of 10.4  4.0 of visual angle.
The full set of stimuli used in this study can be downloaded here: http://www.gunnar-sch
midtmann.com/stimuli-software#TemporalProcessing
The full McGill Face database (Schmidtmann et al., 2020) can be downloaded here:
http://www.gunnar-schmidtmann.com/stimuli-software#McGillFaceDatabase
Terms
All 36 target terms from the RMET were tested (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The three
alternative terms for each target were those established and utilised by Baron-Cohen et al.
(2001), shown in their Appendix A. The alternative terms were those identified by Baron-
Cohen et al. (2001) during development of the RMET. Note that the terms cautious, fanta-
sising, interested, and preoccupied occur twice in the RMET (referred here to as (a) and (b)).
A list of the target terms with the corresponding alternative terms is shown in Table 2.
Procedure
Participants were initially familiarised with each of the 93 terms which appeared within the
test and their corresponding descriptions. Descriptions were extracted from the Glossary of
Appendix B in Baron-Cohen et al. (2001).
We employed the same four-alternative forced choice paradigm as that utilised within the
original RMET task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The experimental block began with presen-
tation of a mid-grey background. On each trial, participants were shown the eye region of a
face portraying an expression for one of eight specific presentation times (12.5, 25, 37.5, 50,
62.5, 75, 87.5, and 100 ms). Within a block, each expression was tested twice at each pre-
sentation time (2 8 36¼ 576 trials per block). Expressions and presentation times were
presented in a random order using an interleaved design. The stimulus was followed imme-
diately by a mask (presented for 500 ms, 8.8  8.8 of visual angle), which comprised
random luminance noise. The purpose of the mask was to remove any residual visual tran-
sient. Following offset of the mask, participants were presented with four terms (font type:
Arial, font colour: white, font size: 60), arranged in a diamond format, on the mid-grey
screen. One of the terms (target) described the expression being portrayed by the stimulus.
The remaining three terms (distractors) were those established by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001)
(Alternative terms in Table 2). The position of the target term (up, down, right, or left)
within the diamond configuration was randomly determined on each trial. The participant
was asked to choose the term which best described the expression being portrayed by the
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stimulus. Response was indicated via keyboard press. No feedback was provided. After an
experimental block, each observer was asked to estimate the proportion of trials on which
they felt that they were guessing the correct term. The guess rates are shown in the rightmost
column of Table 1.
Results
Figure 1 shows performance (response accuracy in proportion correct) as a function of
presentation time ranging from 12.5 to 100 ms. The small circular data points show the
average individual performance for each subject. Performance across observers is shown as
Table 2. List of Target and Alternative Terms Taken From Baron-Cohen et al. (2001).
Target term Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Actor (sex)
1 Playful Comforting Irritated Bored Male
2 Upset Terrified Arrogant Annoyed Female
3 Desire Joking Flustered Convinced Female
4 Insisting Joking Amused Relaxed Male
5 Worried Irritated Sarcastic Friendly Female
6 Fantasising Aghast Impatient Alarmed Male
7 Uneasy Apologetic Friendly Dispirited Female
8 Despondent Relieved Shy Excited Male
9 Preoccupied Annoyed Hostile Horrified Female
10 Cautious Insisting Bored Aghast Female
11 Regretful Terrified Amused Flirtatious Male
12 Sceptical Indifferent Embarrassed Dispirited Female
13 Anticipating Decisive Threatening Shy Male
14 Accusing Irritated Disappointed Depressed Male
15 Contemplative Flustered Encouraging Amused Male
16 Thoughtful Irritated Encouraging Sympathetic Female
17 Doubtful Affectionate Playful Aghast Female
18 Decisive Amused Aghast Bored Male
19 Tentative Arrogant Grateful Sarcastic Female
20 Friendly Dominant Guilty Horrified Male
21 Fantasising Embarrassed Confused Panicked Female
22 Preoccupied Grateful Insisting Imploring Male
23 Defiant Contended Apologetic Curious Male
24 Pensive Irritated Excited Hostile Female
25 Interested Panicked Incredulous Despondent Male
26 Hostile Alarmed Shy Anxious Male
27 Cautious Joking Arrogant Reassuring Male
28 Interested Joking Affectionate Contended Female
29 Reflective Impatient Aghast Irritated Female
30 Flirtatious Grateful Hostile Disappointed Female
31 Confident Ashamed Joking Dispirited Male
32 Serious Ashamed Bewildered Alarmed Female
33 Concerned Embarrassed Guilty Fantasising Female
34 Distrustful Aghast Baffled Terrified Female
35 Nervous Puzzled Insisting Contemplative Male
36 Suspicious Ashamed Nervous Indecisive Male
The rightmost column shows the sex of the actor representing the facial expression.
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the blue solid line, which represents a higher order polynomial regression model fit to
the data.
Results show that the average performance increases with increasing presentation
time. A third-degree polynomial function was fit to the data (coefficient of determina-
tion R2 and p values are shown in Figure 1). Chi-square tests with a Yates correction
for continuity (p> .05) revealed that on average, participants performed better than
chance across all presentation times (Cohen’s w for these tests, presentation times less
than or equal to 25 ms showed small effect sizes (0.3> d> 0.1), while presentation times
greater than 25 ms yielded medium effect sizes (0.5> d> 0.3) (Cohen, 2013). This effect
becomes more pronounced as presentation time increases. The proportion of participants
exceeding change level increased to over 70% for longer presentation times (see
Figure 2).
The mean guess rate across subjects reported by the observers (see Table 1) is 50.4%
(SD¼ 18.5). Figure 3 compares individual estimations of guess rate in comparison to mea-
sured accuracy. Linear regression tests found no correlation between these variables R2 and p
values are shown in each graph in Figure 3. This analysis suggests that participants were not
able to accurately judge the accuracy of their performance.
To investigate whether performance is different for positive or negative terms, the target
terms were grouped into positive and negative by consensus of the authors. The following
terms were considered to be positive: interested, playful, confident, desire, flirtatious, fanta-
sising, friendly; and the terms upset, worried, doubtful, accusing, nervous, suspicious, hostile,
concerned, regretful, despondent, distrustful, and uneasy were identified as negative. The
remaining terms were excluded from this analysis because they were considered neutral or
ambiguous (e.g., “defiant” and “thoughtful”).
Figure 1. Performance (Proportion Correct) as a Function of Presentation Time. The small circular data
points represent mean individual data and the solid blue line shows a third-degree polynomial regression
model fit to the data. The black solid line represents the guessing rate of 0.25 P(correct).
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Figure 4 shows the response accuracy as a function of presentation time. Two-tailed t tests
(Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons), pooled across presentation times, revealed
that the overall accuracy of negative terms and positive terms was statistically significant—
m¼ 0.44, 0.08 SD vs. m ¼0.37, 0.04 SD; t(7)¼4.204, p¼ .004; d¼ 0.45.
Figure 2. Proportion of Subjects Performing Better Than Chance for Each Presentation Time.
Figure 3. Response Accuracy (Proportion Correct) as a Function of Guess Rate.
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Figure 5 shows box-and-whisker plots of response times (considering only response times
under 3s) for correct (orange) and incorrect decisions (blue) across all participants. The
middle line represents the median, and the central box displays the interquartile range
(IQR). The whiskers represent 1.5 times the IQR, and the points plotted outside of these
whiskers represent the outliers. Table A1 shows that most response times were statistically
significantly shorter for incorrect compared to correct decisions based on two-tailed t tests
for each target term (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). In addition, 21 of 30
response times were significantly different (p< .05) in mean response time between correct
and incorrect decision. In an additional analysis, we analysed the effect size to investigate the
magnitude in differences between correct and incorrect response times. The Cohen’s d of the
observed response times was 0.354. This shows that longer response times had a small
magnitude effect (0.5> d> 0.2) on increasing accuracy (Cohen, 2013). Table A2 shows the
results for median responses.
Finally, we present the relationship between correct and incorrect responses in a confusion
matrix in Figure 6. The colour coding within this matrix represents the number of selections
across all participants. The overall diagonal pattern shows that subjects frequently chose the
correct term.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the temporal aspects of processing of facial (eye
region) expressions of complex mental states. Our results show that subjects are able to
recognise subtle and fine-grained differences between facial expressions which convey emo-
tions, intentions, and feelings within a fraction of a second—similar results have been
revealed before (e.g., Derntl et al., 2009). However, interestingly, humans can recognise
Figure 4. Response Accuracy as a Function of Presentation Time for Negative Terms (Blue) and Positive
Terms (Orange).
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Figure 5. Box-and-Whisker Plots of Response Times (Considering Only Response Times Under 3 s) for
Correct (Orange) and Incorrect Decisions (Blue) Across All Participants. The middle line represents the
median, the central box displays the IQR, the whiskers being a function of 1.5 the IQR, and the points plotted
outside of these whiskers representing the outliers.
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these expressions, above chance level, based on information from the eye region only, which
underlines the important role of the eye region in social interactions and that the expressions
in the eyes are a rich source of information about other peoples’ mental states (Grossmann,
2017). The resolution of visual sensitivity to facial expressions is far superior than might be
Figure 6. Confusion Matrix. The colour-code refers to the number of selections across all subjects.
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presumed based on the coarse differences between the Ekman six basic emotions (Ekman,
1992).
In recent years, a number of investigators have pursued the hypothesis that Theory of
Mind might be characterised as a dual system or dual process capacity (Apperly & Butterfill,
2009; Frith & Frith, 2008; Meinhardt-Injac et al., 2018). Dual system hypotheses construe a
cognitive capacity as subserved by two distinct processes. One—often termed System 1—is
typically taken to be unconscious, automatic, and fast, and the other—System 2—conscious,
deliberative, and slow (Evans, 2008). Although these properties, among many others, are not
necessary features of systems, they are characteristic of them. Our findings provide evidence
that mental states can reliably be associated with facial expressions much more rapidly than
previously believed, and most importantly, from the eye regions alone. Our results provide
some novel support for the existence of a rapid Theory of Mind capacity and, indirectly
therefore, for the dual system hypothesis. That facial expressions of complex mental states
can be accurately recognised at very brief presentation times might facilitate nonverbal
communication and rapid adjustment of one’s approach in response to facial expressions
of mental states of another person. Note that our results relate to one specific identity and
the extent to which these results can be generalised to other face identities has yet to be
determined.
Another surprising finding is that subjects significantly underestimated their ability to
make correct decisions at short presentation times. The results shown in Figures 2 and 3
reveal that participants considered themselves to be guessing on a significant proportion of
trials, yet they consistently perform better than chance, even for extremely short presentation
times. There is a huge body of research showing that emotionally charged stimuli, such as
faces with facial expressions, are rapidly and automatically processed (e.g., Almeida et al.,
2013; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Furthermore, it has been shown that responses to emotional
stimuli, in particular linked to threat, lead to involuntary decisions (Globisch et al., 1999;
Lang et al., 1998; €Ohman et al., 1995; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). This might explain the
discrepancy between the perceived and actual performance in the task described here. This
type of automatic processing of facial expressions of emotional states might have developed
to prioritise significant stimuli, presumably those critical for nonverbal communication and
social interactions. Here, we can show for the first time that accurate decisions about a
person’s emotional state can be extracted in an automatic “pre-attentive” and rapid way
from the eye region alone.
As noted in the introduction, the literature on which expressions are more salient—that is,
which are more quickly and easily recognised—is mixed. Some have argued that positive
expressions like happiness are more easily recognised, while others have argued that it is
rather negative expressions like fear or anger that have greater salience (Calvo et al., 2014;
Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008; Palermo & Coltheart, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2008). Our results
show that, with increasing presentation time, performance for negative expressions improved
much more rapidly than that for positive ones. One might argue that this could be based on
image-based aspects of the stimuli used in this study. For instance, Nummenmaa and Calvo
(2015) proposed that contrast is a useful cue for rapid identification of expressions. If the
stimuli differ across positive and negative groupings in terms of contrast, this could explain
the differing results for positive and negative expressions with the two tests. Figure 7 shows
root mean square (RMS) contrasts (Pelli & Bex, 2013; Rovamo et al., 1992) for all 36 stimuli.
There are insignificant variations across the full range of stimuli including both positive and
negative (mean RMS¼ 0.51, 0.004 SD). Image properties are therefore very unlikely to
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explain the observed results. It is, however, important to emphasise that this analysis does
not provide any information about the contrast distribution (more pronounced local fea-
tures) which could be responsible for differences.
It is noteworthy that face expression identification accuracy saturates on average around
55% (see Figure 1). Restriction of available information to the eye region may partly explain
this limitation of performance. It is well established that the eyes make a disproportionate
contribution to the identification of emotional facial expressions (Baron-Cohen, 1997;
Grossmann, 2017; Jack et al., 2012). Previous studies, however, have indicated that other
face features (e.g., nose, mouth) also communicate information which facilitates interpreta-
tion of facial expressions (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Eisenbarth & Alpers, 2011; Yuki et al., 2007).
This suggests that an improvement in accuracy may be achieved if the stimuli were adapted
to include more face information.
In summary, we can show for the very first time that humans can recognise facial expres-
sions of complex mental states, above chance level, within a fraction of a second, based on
information from the eye region only, which underlines the important role of the eye region
in social interactions, and that the expressions in the eyes are a rich source of information
about other peoples’ mental states. In other words, the eyes really are “. . . windows into
other minds . . .” (Grossmann, 2017). The salience of the eye region for inferring an indi-
vidual’s emotional state may be particularly beneficial in situations where information from
other features, such as the mouth, is unavailable. This is of particular relevant in the light of
the current COVID-19 pandemic and the associated wearing of face coverings (see also
Carbon, 2020).
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bution fit to the RMS contrasts.
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Appendix
Table A1. List of Target Term Response Time (Mean), Two-Tailed t-Test Results (Bonferroni Corrected).
Target term
Mean response
time correct
Mean response
time incorrect
Degrees
of freedom t statistics p value
Accusing 1.88 1.59 377 4.72 0.0001
Anticipating 1.87 1.66 368 3.26 0.0394
Cautious 1.90 1.67 755 4.70 0.0001
Concerned 1.82 1.58 403 4.46 0.0003
Confident 1.82 1.72 347 1.32 1.0000
Contemplative 1.81 1.59 407 3.85 0.0044
Decisive 1.78 1.65 373 2.08 1.0000
Defiant 1.85 1.68 377 2.40 0.5443
Desire 1.93 1.67 373 3.94 0.0034
Despondent 1.84 1.69 353 2.06 1.0000
Distrustful 1.88 1.59 372 4.75 0.0001
Doubtful 1.91 1.61 391 4.79 0.0001
Fantasising 1.78 1.69 766 1.88 1.0000
Flirtatious 1.84 1.70 371 2.17 0.9835
Friendly 1.81 1.67 390 2.26 0.7722
Hostile 1.86 1.69 376 2.82 0.1644
Insisting 1.90 1.64 381 4.25 0.0009
Interested 1.85 1.68 707 3.20 0.0475
Nervous 1.83 1.66 394 2.01 1.0000
Pensive 1.86 1.52 389 5.76 0.0000
Playful 1.77 1.62 390 2.40 0.5339
Preoccupied 1.83 1.58 722 5.01 0.0000
Reflective 1.86 1.62 381 3.74 0.0067
Regretful 1.71 1.66 356 0.69 1.0000
Sceptical 1.95 1.57 382 6.46 0.0000
Serious 1.91 1.53 402 6.18 0.0000
Suspicious 1.75 1.45 422 5.74 0.0000
Tentative 1.98 1.56 352 6.45 0.0000
Thoughtful 1.88 1.60 350 4.32 0.0007
Uneasy 1.88 1.57 395 5.33 0.0000
Upset 1.90 1.59 389 4.81 0.0001
Worried 1.74 1.50 428 4.71 0.0001
Table A2. List of Target Term Response Time (Median), Moody’s Median (Bonferroni Corrected).
Target term
Median response
time correct
Median response
time incorrect
Degrees
of freedom t statistics p value
Accusing 1.88 1.59 377 21.96 .0049
Anticipating 1.87 1.66 368 14.34 .0026
Cautious 1.90 1.67 755 18.88 1.0000
Concerned 1.82 1.58 403 19.64 .0000
Confident 1.82 1.72 347 1.42 .0000
Contemplative 1.81 1.59 407 14.59 .0000
(continued)
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Table A2. Continued.
Target term
Median response
time correct
Median response
time incorrect
Degrees
of freedom t statistics p value
Decisive 1.78 1.65 373 1.61 1.0000
Defiant 1.85 1.68 377 7.88 .0719
Desire 1.93 1.67 373 10.07 .0003
Despondent 1.84 1.69 353 0.87 .0034
Distrustful 1.88 1.59 372 18.92 .0004
Doubtful 1.91 1.61 391 22.05 .2041
Fantasising 1.78 1.69 766 1.42 1.0000
Flirtatious 1.84 1.70 371 3.47 .0000
Friendly 1.81 1.67 390 9.34 1.0000
Hostile 1.86 1.69 376 7.44 .0005
Insisting 1.90 1.64 381 15.02 .0001
Interested 1.85 1.68 707 3.07 1.0000
Nervous 1.83 1.66 394 2.28 .0092
Pensive 1.86 1.52 389 29.30 .1596
Playful 1.77 1.62 390 3.33 1.0000
Preoccupied 1.83 1.58 722 18.73 1.0000
Reflective 1.86 1.62 381 13.16 .0000
Regretful 1.71 1.66 356 1.57 .0000
Sceptical 1.95 1.57 382 42.76 .0043
Serious 1.91 1.53 402 25.14 .0004
Suspicious 1.75 1.45 422 23.77 .0482
Tentative 1.98 1.56 352 38.61 .0000
Thoughtful 1.88 1.60 350 25.89 .0001
Uneasy 1.88 1.57 395 29.95 1.0000
Upset 1.90 1.59 389 15.53 1.0000
Worried 1.74 1.50 428 4.11 1.0000
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